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Abstract:
Hume developed an original and revolutionary theoretical paradigm for explaining the
spontaneous emergence of the classic conventions of justice—stable possession, trans-
ference of property by consent, and the obligation to fulﬁll promises. In a scenario of
scarce external resources, Hume’s central idea is that the development of the rules of jus-
tice responds to a sense of common interest that progressively tames the destructiveness
of natural self-love and expands the action of natural moral sentiments. By handling
conceptual tools that anticipated game theory for centuries, Hume was able to break
with rationalism, the natural law school, and Hobbes’s contractarianism. Unlike natu-
ral moral sentiments, the sense of justice is valuable and reaches full strength within a
general plan or system of actions. However, unlike game theory, Hume does not assume
that people have transparent access to the their own motivations and the inner structure
of the social world. In contrast, he blends ideas such as cognitive delusion, learning by
experience and coordination to construct a theory that still deserves careful discussion,
even though it resists classiﬁcation under contemporary headings.
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1. Introduction
In the Treatise (Hume 1978; in the following cited as T followed by page num-
bers) and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (Hume 1983; cited as
E followed by page numbers)1 Hume discusses the morality of justice by using
a revolutionary method that displays the foundation of justice in social utility
and the progression of mankind. Hume dismisses a rationalist explanation of
justice by relying upon his thesis, defended in section I, part I, book III of the
Treatise that “moral distinctions are not derived from reason”. He also discards
an explanation based on natural self-interest. His words in this respect leave no
possible doubt: “[I]t is certain, that self-love, when it acts at its liberty, instead
of engaging us to honest actions, is the source of all injustice and violence.” (T,
480) If the source of justice is neither reason nor natural self-interest, what is it?
To answer this question, Hume formulates a theory of justice that can be called
* I am grateful to Bernd Lahno and Maura Priest for comments on an earlier version.
1 Spelling in the Hume texts has been modernized.48 Horacio Spector
conventionalist in a rather unorthodox sense of ‘convention’, which he deﬁnes in
the third appendix to the second Enquiry:
“It has been asserted by some, that justice arises from human con-
ventions, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, or combi-
nation of mankind. If by convention be here meant a promise (which
is the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be more absurd
than this position. The observance of promises is itself one of the
most considerable parts of justice; and we are not surely bound to
keep our word, because we have given our word to keep it. But if by
convention be meant a sense of common interest; which sense each
man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and
which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan
or system of actions which tends to public utility; it must be owned,
that, in this sense, justice arises from human conventions.” (E, 95)
In the quoted paragraph Hume summarizes his theory about how the clas-
sic system of justice—i.e., the conventions of property or constant possession,
its transference by voluntary agreement and the undertaking of promissory
obligations—has arisen gradually as the unintended outcome of individual deci-
sions guided by a sense of common interest. It is worth quoting a commentator
in this respect: “To see justice in this way, as an unintended consequence of in-
dividual human actions, must be one of the boldest moves in the history of the
philosophy of law.” (Haakonssen 1981, 20)
Though the consistent reconstruction of Hume’s theory is far from simple,
it might be thought that little of value remains to be said in light of the abun-
dance of classic and contemporary commentaries. I believe, however, that the
complexities of Hume’s thought leave room for further discussion. Hume con-
structs his theory in three discernible stages. First, Hume needs to display the
social artiﬁciality of the virtue of justice and the mechanisms through which this
artiﬁciality is generally masked. Second, Hume seeks to provide a naturalistic,
nonpolitical explanation of the patterns of behavior that are required by the
conventions of justice. Third, Hume wants to explain why we call those patterns
of behavior morally virtuous and why we judge them as morally praiseworthy.
The difference between the second and third stages is that, in the former, Hume
focuses on agents’ behaviors, whereas in the latter he is concerned with third-
person moral judgment.
In this paper I will concentrate on the three stages of Hume’s explanation
of justice and I will largely leave aside his theory of government and political
allegiance. In section 2, I discuss the famous ‘is-ought’ passage. In section 3, I
turn my attention to Hume’s argument for the artiﬁciality of the virtue of justice.
In section 4, I discuss his view about the spontaneous and progressive emergence
of justice. In section 5, I address Hume’s account of the consolidation of justice
as a result of annexing the idea of moral praiseworthiness to the originally self-
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between Hume’s theory, on the one hand, and contractarianism and indirect
utilitarianism, on the other.
2.
Hume says that every moral theory he knows makes a surprising deduction from
propositions connected with ‘is’ and ‘is not’ to conclusions connected with ‘ought’
and ‘ought not’. “This change”—he goes on—“is imperceptible; but is, however,
of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new re-
lation or afﬁrmation, “it is necessary that it should be observed and explained;
and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are
entirely different from it.” (T, 469) It has been common to think—perhaps as
a consequence of G. E. Moore’s account of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’—that what
Hume really claims is that the derivation of ought-statements from merely de-
scriptive statements is fallacious. But it is plain that Hume does not share
at all Moore’s thesis that naturalism commits any ‘fallacy’, because he himself
provides a naturalistic account of moral notions. For instance, Hume adopts a
naturalistic analysis of ‘natural obligation’. Thus, for Hume the proposition ‘We
lie under an obligation to do X’ means something like ‘The non-performance of
X is vicious’. As Frankena (1939) has long ago shown, it would beg the question
to claim that a naturalistic account is fallacious just because one assumes that
naturalism is false.
Curiously, in a classic essay John Searle (1964) sought to show that ‘institu-
tional ought’s’ can be derived from ‘institutional is’s’, but believed that this was
a way of refuting Hume’s ‘is-ought’ doctrine. Searle claimed that ‘ought’ can be
deduced from ‘is’ within the context of institutionalized forms of obligation. In
this way he intended “to demonstrate a counterexample” to Hume’s thesis that
“no set of statements of fact by themselves entails any statement of value”. But
Hume just says that the deduction seems inconceivable, not that it is inconceiv-
able. How could he otherwise deduce conclusions establishing obligations and
rights from factual observations concerning the basic circumstances of human
society?
Commentators acknowledge today that Hume does not take the derivation
of ‘ought’ from ‘is’ to be a fallacy. Therefore, the ‘is-ought’ passage should be
read as an introduction to the discussion of the rules of justice. Thus, Alasdair
MacIntyre (1969) says that Hume does not regard the inference as logically im-
possible. Hume requires that the inference “should be observed and explained”.
In fact, Hume cites psychological and sociological remarks as premises for his
explanation of justice. Selﬁshness and conﬁned generosity, on the one hand, and
the scarcity and instability of possession of external goods, on the other, are the
fundamental facts that explain why we have a basic common, shared interest
in establishing the conventions of justice. These conventions are the stability50 Horacio Spector
of possession, its disposition by consent and the obligation to keep promises.
MacIntyre thinks that Hume justiﬁes the obligations of justice on the basis of
those facts, thus engaging in the deduction he has emphatically denunciated.
In support of his interpretation, MacIntyre quotes the following passage: “And
even every individual person must ﬁnd himself a gainer, on balancing the ac-
count; since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve, and everyone
must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which is inﬁnitely worse than
the worst situation that can possibly be supposed in society.” (T 497) Despite the
quotation, I agree with Murray MacBeth (1992) that Hume’s primary goal is not
to offer a justiﬁcation of the conventions of justice, but rather an explanation of
their emergence and consolidation. He also seeks to explain the moral approba-
tion of justice as a social fact, as something different from justifying this appro-
bation. However, if Hume’s explanation of the establishment of the convention
of justice is sound, it must be true that the participants in the convention reason
from factual premises to the normative conclusion that they ought to approve of
the rules of justice. For the moral approval of the rules of justice to be consilient
with Hume’s explanatory account, these reasonings have to be premised on the
same factual claims that he includes in the explanans of the rules of justice.
Annette Baier defends a position similar to MacIntyre’s. She points out that,
in the famous paragraph, Hume purports to attack the deﬁciencies of rational-
ist moral theories rather than to make a general impossibility claim. Baier
says: “He [Hume] observes and explains the transition from facts about impor-
tance to claims about norms, from facts about conventions to conclusions about
rights, and makes them reasonable.” (Baier 1991, 177) In overlooking the ex-
planation/justiﬁcation distinction, Baier makes herself also liable to MacBeth’s
critique. But the rejoinder I offered previously is here also available.
My reading is in the MacIntyre/Baier tradition, but I emphasize the internal-
ist sense of the paragraph. Hume’s moral theory is internalist in that he under-
stands moral notions as inherently motivational. On this view, moral proposi-
tions must have an adequate connection to internal motivational acts or states.
What is bafﬂing to Hume, I think, is how ‘external’ facts, that is, facts unrelated
to our passions and motives, can create new moral obligations. Hume has no
objection to the proposition that our natural passions and sentiments can war-
rant natural obligations, but he is reluctant to accept that an ‘external’ fact can
create, in and of itself, an obligation. It is certainly puzzling to regard someone’s
promising or occupying a tract of land as obligation-generating facts. Therefore,
I take Hume’s ‘is-ought problem’ to be really that of explaining how claims on
‘external’ facts can entail new obligations. Indeed, what requires an explanation
is not the inference of ‘ought’ from any ‘is’. What demands an explanation is the
derivation of ought-judgments from statements that denote ‘external’ facts, that
is, facts unrelated to our natural inclinations.
The best interpretation of the ‘is-ought’ passage does not view it as the de-
nunciation of a fallacy, but as the preamble to an explanation of artiﬁcial obliga-
tions. Artiﬁcial ‘ought’s’ can be deduced from certain ‘is’s’, even if the inference is
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mitted. It can be avoided by just providing an explanation of justice, as Hume
precisely does. Conversely, if the explanation is wanting or fails, “a very gross
fallacy” is certainly committed. Hume says: “Those, therefore, who make use of
the word property, or right, or obligation, before they have explained the origin
of justice, or even make use of it in that explication, are guilty of a very gross
fallacy, and can never reason upon any solid foundation.” (T, 491; italics added)
The fallacy is not just to deduce ‘ought’ from ‘is’, but rather to do so without a
prior explanation about the origin of justice. When such explanation is given,
the derivation is possible, and no fallacy is involved. So it seems that the expla-
nation of ‘artiﬁcial ought’s’, which Hume demands in the ‘is-ought passage’, is
really the explanation of the origin of justice. Once this explanation is provided,
‘ought’ can be deduced from ‘is’. The “gross fallacy” is to try to infer prescriptions
about justice from ‘externalist’ factual claims in the absence of an explanation
of the origin of justice.
3.
How does Hume prove that justice obligations are artiﬁcial rather than natural?
He avails himself of a logical method for disclosing the artiﬁciality of justice.
He assumes that nature by necessity accords with logical principles, and that,
therefore, the descriptions of natural phenomena cannot lead to inconsistencies
or fallacies. If nature does not cause fallacies, the discovery of hidden fallacies
in our reasonings is a mark of our own intellectual frailty, that is, of artiﬁciality.
Hume dissects our ideas of justice and shows that the rules of justice are con-
trived, invented and projected onto the world, rather than discovered. Hume’s
assumption is that human societies generate superstitions that present them-
selves as if they were realities. But superstitions are imperfect and, therefore,
empirical observation and philosophical argument can discover their contrived
character.
In the Treatise Hume’s view about the merit and demerit of virtuous actions
is a subjectivist one. The moral quality of benevolence does not lie in the external
behavior but in the underlying motive. Hume asserts that “when we praise any
actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions
as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper” (T, 477). He
adds: “The external performance has no merit.” (T, 477) A few pages later, he
asks: “Wherein consists this honesty and justice, which you ﬁnd in restoring a
loan, and abstaining from the property of others?” (T, 480) And he answers in
this way: “It does not surely lie in the external action. It must, therefore, be
placed in the motive, from which the external action is derived. This motive can
never be a regard to the honesty of the action. For it is a plain fallacy to say, that
a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action honest, and at the same time
that a regard to the honesty is the motive of the action. We can never have a
regard to the virtue of an action, unless the action be antecedently virtuous.” (T,52 Horacio Spector
480) From this he concludes that “we have naturally no real or universal motive
for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance;
and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from
some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a
circle. Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has established a sophistry,
and rendered it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of
justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artiﬁcially, though
necessarily from education, and human conventions.” (T, 483) Hume detects a
circular reasoning embedded in the language of justice and regards it as a “mark
of artiﬁce and contrivance” (T, 528).
Hume needs a further premise to substantiate his assumption that the sense
of justice cannot count as a natural motive. For Hume natural sentiments have
the following two marks. First, natural moral sentiments have a reference to
sympathetic engagement and, therefore, are directed toward someone else’s af-
fections or sentiments, or to mankind or society as a whole. For instance, private
benevolence is a natural virtue because it is directed to someone else’s suffering
or needs, and public benevolence is a virtue because it is directed to mankind or
society in general. Hume rejects the idea that the sense of justice can be a regard
to either private or public interest (T, 480–2). Justice cannot be equated with
public or private benevolence because neither the public nor the private interest
is naturally or necessarily attached to all particular acts of justice. For instance,
the sense of justice requires actions that often fail to be a form of sympathy with
the person to whom we owe the just action, as when he is “a vicious man”, who
“deserves the hatred of all mankind” (T, 482). Second, natural moral sentiments
are intrinsically good. For instance, generosity is always morally praiseworthy
and its moral praiseworthiness does not depend on the maintenance of general
patterns of behavior. Hume says very clearly that the “social virtues of human-
ity and benevolence exert their inﬂuence immediately, by a direct tendency or
instinct”, and he goes on to say that “the good, resulting from their benign inﬂu-
ence, is in itself complete and entire”, and that it “excites the moral sentiment
of approbation, without any reﬂection on farther consequences, and without any
more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other members of
society” (E, 93).
In acute fashion Hume claims that, unlike the natural virtues, the social
virtues of justice and ﬁdelity are only socially good. He says: “They are highly
useful, or indeed absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind: But the
beneﬁt, resulting from them, is not the consequence of every individual single
act; but arises from the whole scheme or system, concurred in by the whole, or
the greater part of the society.” (E, 94) This instrumental account of justice im-
plies that when social convergence is absent, justice is useless and it is pointless
to follow its constraints. The example of the society of rufﬁans seems like an
application of the theory of the second best: “Suppose likewise, that it should be
a virtuous man’s fate to fall into the society of rufﬁans, remote from the protec-
tion of laws and government; what conduct must he embrace in that melancholy
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intrinsically good: “[H]is particular regard to justice being no longer of use to
his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates of self-preservation
alone [...].” (E, 23)
Hume’s circularity argument is amenable to different interpretations. To
start with, it is perplexing to hold that honest acts, such as restoring a lent sum
of money (T, 479), are virtuous (though artiﬁcially so) only if they derive from a
separate motive, and at the same time to deny that honest acts can have a sep-
arate motive. There are at least three possible ways out of this difﬁculty. The
ﬁrst way, suggested by Mackie (1980, 79f.), is that Hume relaxes the require-
ment of an independent motive for artiﬁcial virtues. Honest acts can be made
out a regard to justice alone, even if a regard to justice is simply deﬁned as a
disposition to perform honest acts. Mackie suggests a reformulation of Hume’s
premise along this line: Actions count as naturally virtuous only in so far as
they are signs of virtuous motives; actions count as artiﬁcially virtuous if they
are made out of regard to a general scheme that promotes the public good.
An alternative interpretation ﬁnds textual support in the section of the Trea-
tise in which Hume discusses the obligations created by promises (Section V,
Second Part, Book III). Hume reproduces his general claim that there is no
natural motive that causes a natural obligation to fulﬁl promises: “Now it is
evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct
from a sense of duty. If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we
never should feel any inclination to observe them.” (T, 518) Again, the problem
is that the sense of duty does not generate an obligation to perform promises,
but rather is a consequence of this obligation: “[A] sense of duty supposes an an-
tecedent obligation.” (T, 518) In order to accommodate Hume’s axiomatic claim
about the value of all meritorious actions, the artiﬁciality of the obligation to
do as promised is concealed under a sophistic metaphysics of the mind. Thus,
Hume thinks that promising involves feigning a natural motive because “every
new promise imposes a new obligation of morality on the person who promises”
(T, 524). He says that this new obligation is thought to arise from the promisor’s
will: “Here, therefore, we feign a new act of the mind, which we call the will-
ing an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality to depend.” (T, 523) This
imagined act of the mind is utterly ﬁctional: “[I]t is one of the most mysteri-
ous and incomprehensible operations that can possibly be imagined, and may
even be compared to transubstantiation, or holy orders, where a certain forms of
words, along with a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external
object, and even of a human creature.” (T, 524)2
2 Hume discusses the ﬁctionalization in the discourse of justice even before dealing with the obli-
gation of performing promises, in the section on the transference of property by consent. Rather
than as an external object, Hume conceives of property as social construct: “The property of an
object, when taken for something real, without any reference to morality, or the sentiments of
the mind, is a quality perfectly insensible, and even inconceivable; nor can we form any distinct
notion, either of its stability or translation.” (T, 515) But it is the translation of property that
requires still a greater deal of imagination. Hume says that, “in order to aid the imagination”, we
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Mackie (1980, 103) stresses the ﬁctional component of this explanation in
holding that “promising involves the ﬁction that we create an obligation by a
special act of the mind, the willing of that very obligation”. This ﬁctional in-
terpretation makes sense if one does not relax the principle that all meritorious
actions are signs of underlying motives that are constitutive of their essence.
That is, if all meritorious actions are signs of prior motives, and the observance
of promises is meritorious, we must postulate the existence of a motive that is
prior to and independent of the existence of the obligation. Now, since the sense
of duty does not ﬁt into the deﬁnition of a natural motive, because it presup-
poses the existence of the relevant duty, it is necessary to feign the existence of
a motive.
Knud Haakonssen adopts a similar reading. He claims that the psychologi-
cal mechanism Hume envisages is a two-step one. First, “the natural tendency
in men to see behaviour as an expression of motives, and motives as expres-
sions of qualities of character, leads them to imagine that there is a natural
motive (and thus a character trait), namely the willing of an obligation, behind
promises [...].” (Haakonsssen 1978, 13). Second, agents morally approve of this
feigned motive in oneself or others, and disapprove of its lacking in general or on
particular occasions. When it is oneself who lacks the motive, self-hatred is ad-
dressed to this (imagined) “defect and imperfection in the mind and temper” (T,
518). This self-hatred has a motivational force but is nonetheless an irrational
sentiment in that its factual assumption (i.e., the existence of a natural motive)
is false. It is important to notice that the actuating force of promises derives on
this account from a natural sentiment too. It is the natural sentiment to hate
oneself for having a bad character. Compassion, for instance, is backed by this
self-hatred: “Though there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our hu-
manity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the
omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of
humanity.” (T, 518)
I propose a third line of interpretation that maintains that the motive be-
hind promises is a real one, though its appearance as a natural motive is feigned.
Promisors who have a sense of duty really feel motivated to perform the promise,
even when they have never entered into the state of self-hatred because the prior
existence of the motive was not questioned. What promisors imagine is not a
motive, which they already have in the form a sense of duty, but rather its nat-
uralness. Feigned motives are not motives at all because they lack motivational
force. But motives can be represented through the false image of a natural mo-
tive. The sense of duty is a motive artiﬁcially implanted in persons. It behaves
as any other motive, namely, leading agents to act in the relevant ways. So it is
not feigned motives what gives promises their motivational force, but rather real
motives that pass off as genuine natural motives. Acts are naturally meritorious
or obligatory if they stem from passions such as self-love, private beneﬁcence or
public interest. We do not encounter any of these natural passions in the case of
ence of property effectively perfected, and, when the physical delivery is not possible, “men have
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just actions. Therefore, the sense of duty must be implanted in agents by con-
ventions, but once implanted it is a real motive, any confusion about its origin
notwithstanding.
4.
Hume claims that the rules of justice are social inventions. But what kind of
inventions? Inventions often are deliberately designed artifacts to serve various
purposes. For instance, bridges, harbors, ramparts, canals, ﬂeets and armies
are deliberately invented (T, 539). It would be a serious mistake to think that
the rules of justice have been invented in the same way (let alone engineered or
planned). Like other authors in the Scottish enlightenment (e.g., Adam Fergu-
son), Hume maintains that the fundamental institutions of mankind are spon-
taneous and unintended consequences of people’s self-interested actions. Hume
means that they are evolved rather than designed inventions:
“Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for
common interest, without any promise or contract: Thus gold and
silver are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words
and language are ﬁxed by human convention and agreement. What-
ever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their
part; but what loses all advantage, if only one perform, can arise
from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any
one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct.” (E, 95)
Hume claims that the conventions of justice have arisen as a byproduct of col-
lective patterns of behavior originally motivated by self-interest and self-love:
“This system (of justice), therefore, comprehending the interest of each individ-
ual, is of course advantageous to the public; though it be not intended for that
purpose by the inventors.” (T, 529) However, as indicated at the beginning of this
essay, it is not natural self-love or self-interest, but self-love coupled with judg-
ment and understanding that is the original source of the conventions of justice:
“The remedy, then, is not derived from nature, but from artiﬁce; or more prop-
erly speaking nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding,
for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections.” (T, 489; latter italics
added)
How does Hume conceive of the gradual evolution of the institution of justice?
This is by no means an easy question (cf. Kliemt 1986, 74). The key to under-
standing Hume’s thought is that he viewed society as a mutually advantageous
invention. In this he echoes Hobbes’s idea that civil society is a way to escape
from the dark state of nature. The inﬁrmities of mankind foredooms the human
species to tragedy without an invention that makes up for mankind’s inﬁrmi-
ties: “Of all the animals, with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards
whom nature seems, at ﬁrst sight, to have exercised more cruelty than towards56 Horacio Spector
man, in the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him,
and in the slender means, which she affords to the relieving these necessities.”
(T, 484)
He goes on to say that “society provides a remedy” in a three-fold way: “By
the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented. By the partition of employ-
ments, our ability increases. And by mutual succor we are less exposed to for-
tune and accidents.” (T, 485) Now, the main challenge to the maintenance of
society, which originally grows from the ‘natural appetites betwixt the sexes’
and the new affection to company and conversation cultivated by early society,
is the “insatiable, perpetual, universal and directly destructive of society avid-
ity of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends”
(T, 491f.). This destructive sentiment would prevent people from the peaceful
“enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry and good
fortune” (T, 487) if all the members of society did not enter into a convention
“to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods” (T, 489). Hume
stresses that “the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability
of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment
of human society, and that after the agreement for the ﬁxing and observing of
this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect
harmony and concord” (T, 491). Therefore, the convention for the stability of
possession is a sine qua non condition of the existence of society, which, in turn,
is indispensable for rescuing mankind from the bleak prospects of a solitary and
violent existence.
As the paragraph quoted at the beginning of this paper shows, Hume rejects
the idea that the origin of justice rests on a promise or contract. The convention
founding justice arises from “a general sense of common interest” (T, 490). Hume
explains the operation of the convention in this way: “I observe, that it will be
for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will
act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in
the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually
expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour.
And this may properly enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us
[...].” (T, 490) In the Treatise Hume gives two well-known examples to illustrate
the emergence of the rules of justice without an explicit convention.3 The ﬁrst
example, already quoted, is the spontaneous cooperation between two rowers:
“Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or con-
vention, though they have never given promises to each other. Nor
is the rule governing the stability of possession the less derived from
human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by
a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconve-
niences of transgressing it.” (T, 490; italics added)
3 See Hardin 2007, 84–5, for a detailed list of coordination examples in Hume’s works.Hume’s Theory of Justice 57
The second example is given in the section on the origin of government: “Two
neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; be-
cause it is easy for them to know each other’s mind; and each must perceive,
that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the
whole project.” (T, 538)
The standard way of modeling the two examples is by means of a matrix that
represents a perfect convergence of interests (ﬁgure 1). Both agents have a sin-
gle individually and collectively advantageous strategy. Though Hume thinks
that situation can be called ‘properly enough’ a ‘convention’ or ‘agreement’, they
are hardly conventions or agreements in a proper sense, because both agents
will predictably pursue their (weakly) dominant strategy. To be sure, since the
game has two equilibria, the question of equilibrium selection can be formally
raised. But coordination seems all too natural in this situation because individ-
ual failing guarantees the minimal payoff 0 while choosing Row/Drain offers a
chance of one unit with no risk of any loss. So there is no coordination problem
in these examples (Hardin 2007, 78–9). Though a modicum of understanding
is certainly necessary to prevent failing, norms or conventions of coordination
seem unnecessary (see also Ullman-Margalit 1977, 79f.). Under this analysis,
it can be contested whether Hume’s examples should be understood as exem-
plifying a proper theoretical model of the conventions of justice. Hume should
be interpreted, instead, as giving just two examples of how a sort of agreement
can be reached without the need for explicit consent. On this interpretation, the
analogy between the emergence of stable possession and the cooperative pat-
terns in the two examples would only run as long as one focuses on the common
implicit character of otherwise different kinds of social cooperation.
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may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because it is easy for them 
to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his 
failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project” (T, 538). 
 
   Player  2 
   Row/Drain Fail 
Player 1 
Row/Drain 1  |  1  0  |  0 
Fail  0  |  0  0  |  0 
Figure 1: Convergence of interests 
 
The standard way of modeling the two examples is by means of a matrix that represents a 
perfect convergence of interests (Figure 1).  Both agents have a single individually and 
collectively advantageous strategy.  Though Hume thinks that situation can be called 
“properly enough” a “convention” or “agreement”, they are hardly conventions or 
agreements in a proper sense, because both agents will predictably pursue their (weakly) 
dominant strategy. To be sure, since the game has two equilibria, the question of 
equilibrium selection can be formally raised. But coordination seems all too natural in this 
situation because individual failing guarantees the minimal payoff 0 while choosing 
Row/Drain offers a chance of one unit with no risk of any loss. So there is no coordination 
problem in these examples (Hardin 2007, 78-9). Though a modicum of understanding is 
certainly necessary to prevent failing, norms or conventions of coordination seem 
Figure 1: Convergence of interests
A preferable model for representing the essential properties of the convention
of justice as characterized by Hume may well be the Stag Hunt Game (Skyrms
2004). This is a coordination game that also includes two equilibria. And, again,
one equilibrium, in which both men row or drain, is the most advantageous,
while the other, in which both opt for playing alone, is less advantageous. But
now opting for the less advantageous equilibrium is safer because its success58 Horacio Spector
does not depend on the other partner (ﬁgure 2).4 Thus, there is no guarantee
that the players will follow their best (joint) strategy.
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unnecessary (see also Ullman-Margalit 1977, 79 f). Under this analysis, it can be contested 
whether Hume’s examples should be understood as exemplifying a proper theoretical 
model of the conventions of justice.  Hume should be interpreted, instead, as giving just 
two examples of how a sort of agreement can be reached without the need for explicit 
consent. On this interpretation, the analogy between the emergence of stable possession and 
the cooperative patterns in the two examples would only run as long as one focuses on the 
common implicit character of otherwise different kinds of social cooperation.   
 
   Player  2 
   Row/Drain Fail 
Player 1 
Row/Drain 2  |  2  0  |  1 
Fail  1  |  0  1  |  1 
Figure 2: Stag Hunt game 
 
 
A preferable model for representing the essential properties of the convention of justice as   
characterized by Hume may well be the Stag Hunt Game (Skyrms 2004). This is a 
coordination game that also includes two equilibria.  And, again, one equilibrium, in which 
both men row or drain, is the most advantageous, while the other, in which both opt for 
playing alone, is less advantageous. But now opting for the less advantageous equilibrium 
Figure 2: Stag Hunt game
The game is inspired in a parable of Rousseau in A Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality (1993, 86f.): “If a deer was to be taken, every one saw that, in order
to succeed, he must abide faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come
within the reach of any one of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it
without scruple, and, having seized his prey, cared very little, if by so doing he
caused his companions to miss theirs.” Rousseau’s story is useful to highlight
Hume’s theory of justice (though perhaps the application is infelicitous given
Rousseau’s rancor for Hume; see Zaretsky and Scott 2009). The story makes it
clear that partners can defect joint endeavors that are both individually and col-
lectively advantageous out of risk-aversion, miscalculation of probabilities, high
discount rate, or plain irrationality. In like manner, the stability of possessions
and the other rules of justice can be threatened by defective behaviors even if
the social union that such conventions allow has immense advantages in terms
of conjunction of forces, division of labor, mutual succor and other forms of social
cooperation. Hume thinks that, without the conventions of justice, “society must
immediately dissolve, and every one must fall into that savage and solitary con-
dition, which is inﬁnitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be
supposed in society” (T, 497).
The tragedy of social dissolution can be modeled as the undesirable equi-
librium in a stag-hunt game. But it could also be modeled as the undesirable
equilibrium in a chicken game, or as the Hobbesian equilibrium in a prisoners’
dilemma game. I think it is misguided to attribute to Hume one single model.
In fact, the relevant texts in the Treatise can support various interpretations,
and some of them are incompatible with the model of perfect convergence sug-
gested by his two famous examples. Thus, some of Hume’s paragraphs evoke a
coordination game with multiple equilibria, or even a prisoners’ dilemma game.
For instance, Hume says that when the stability of possession is developing: “I
observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his
4 See Lewis 1989, 7; Ullman-Margalit 1977, 121–4. In ﬁgure 2 I follow Ullman-Margalit’s modeling
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goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me.” (T, 490; ital-
ics in the original) This suggests that the cooperative player suffers a loss if the
other player defects.
In any case, which model we choose is unimportant, because Hume had in
mind a diversity of social situations that possess one common trait: a joint strat-
egy is available that is in the best interest of all the participants. This can hap-
pen in interactions that can be modeled in various ways. The important point is
that Hume regards the emergence of justice as the unintended outcome of an in-
telligent practice of understanding and judgment focused on a general plan of ac-
tions. The endorsement of this system carries with it the progressive emergence
of a sense of justice that is different from natural self-interest. The perception of
the potential gains arising from the conventions of justice is not immediate, and
justice-generating patterns of behavior are strengthened by a “slow progression”
and by “our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it”. It is
evident that standard game-theoretical tools are too simplistic to model this pro-
cess because they do not consider the feedback mechanisms that operate when
participants’ motivational and cognitive systems change over time in response
to new environments that are produced by the unexpected consequences of their
prior decisions. “Justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement”
(T, 498) when men “have had experience enough to observe, that whatever may
be the consequence of any single act of justice, performed by a single person,
yet the whole system of actions, concurred in by the whole society, is inﬁnitely
advantageous to the whole, and to every part” (T, 497–8). Learning by experi-
ence, and not merely static self-interest, is the driving force of the evolution to
a just society. Hume’s elegant prose is worth quoting: “History, experience, rea-
son sufﬁciently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and
in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become
acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue.” (T, 26)
5.
In a ‘narrow and contracted society’ a model of coordination could explain the
emergence of stable rules of possession on the assumption that the parties are
endowed with sound judgment and understanding. Yet, when society “becomes
numerous, and increases to a tribe or nation”, the interest in the preservation of
justice “becomes remote” (T, 499). In these conditions, men do not “readily per-
ceive, that disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules, as in
a more narrow and contracted society” (T, 499). In a large society, the currency
of the conventions of justice requires that “we annex the idea of virtue to justice,
and of vice to injustice” (T, 498). In other words, the natural obligation to jus-
tice must be transformed into a moral obligation. This can be done by means of
moral language and moral criticism addressed to other people’s just and unjust
actions, regardless of whether such actions are close to or distant from us (both60 Horacio Spector
geographically or historically). Hume thinks that we naturally praise human
behavior because of its utility: “It appears to be matter of fact, that the circum-
stance of utility, in all subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: That it is
constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit
of actions [...].” (E, 50) “The esteem for justice as useful and indeed necessary
to the support of society relies on a natural sentiment of agreeableness that
serves to turn justice into a moral obligation, and, therefore, to give it a stronger
foundation.” (E, 34)
How can moral judgment operate more effectively in our actions than the
virtue of justice itself? The reason Hume gives is that there is an asymmetry in
our attitudes toward our behavior and toward other agents’ behaviors. Basically,
we see more easily the mote in somebody else’s eye than the beam in one’s own.
Hume makes the point very clearly: “But though in our own actions we may
frequently lose sight of that interest, which we have in maintaining order, and
may follow a lesser and more present interest, we never fail to observe the prej-
udice we receive, either mediately or immediately, from the injustice of others;
as not being in that case either blinded by passion, or bypassed by any contrary
temptation.” (T, 499)
Hume states his theory of moral criticism in this way: “Thus self-interest is
the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public in-
terest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue.” (T, 499f.)
Whereas self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice, the
natural sentiments of regard for public usefulness and sympathy for other peo-
ple ground the moral approbation of justice. In turn, the moral approbation of
justice generates the moral obligation to justice. When we contemplate injustice
done by others, we understand immediately the prejudice done to the person
who suffered the injustice and to human society in general. Our sympathy with
public utility makes us condemn the injustice done by the actions of others and,
progressively, also the injustice we make when we “sympathize with others in
the sentiments they entertain of us”. Conversely, we morally approve of just
actions because of their social utility.
The operation of natural sympathy is strengthened by the artiﬁces of politi-
cians, who “endeavor to produce an esteem for justice, and an abhorrence of
injustice”, “in order to govern men more easily and preserve peace in human
society” (T, 500). Though sympathy is a natural moral sentiment, the arti-
ﬁce of politicians assists nature. The artiﬁce is conceptual. Politicians coin
the words ‘honorable’ or ‘dishonorable’, ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘blamable’ in order to
praise justice and blame injustice. Though these concepts are artiﬁcial, their
motivational effectiveness is nurtured by our natural inclination to esteem pub-
lic utility. What politicians do is to “extend the natural sentiments beyond their
original bounds” (T, 500).
Hume underlines the role of private education and instruction. The incul-
cation of the principles of probity and of sentiments of honor by parents are
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children “to regard the observance of those rules, by which society is maintained,
as worthy and honourable, and their violation as base and infamous” (T, 500f.).
The picture of how justice acquires solidity in numerous societies is only com-
plete at the end of the section when Hume refers to the interest in our reputa-
tion: “There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and
nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation
to the property of others.” (T, 501) In order to preserve his reputation a man
“must ﬁx an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be induced
to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of probity and honour”
(T, 501).
6.
Hume’s conventionalist theory of justice deﬁes classiﬁcation under contempo-
rary headings. It is not fully contractarian, because the notions of voluntary
choice, consent, and promise play no role in his theory. By the same token, the
concept of an actual or hypothetical contract, which is the contemporary render-
ing of those notions, is also alien to Hume’s thought. Contractarianism involves
the (1) deliberate, (2) unanimous and (3) mutually advantageous (actual or hy-
pothetical) choice of legal and political principles in a given baseline. Hume is at
pains to clarify that the principles of justice are not the outcome of a deliberate
convention (governed by unanimous or less-than-unanimous decision-making
rules). For Hume the principles of justice do not derive from a single, synchronic,
collective decision-making process. On the contrary, the system of actions that
Hume calls the convention of justice arises as the byproduct of a gradual and
progressive series of individual choices aided by understanding, judgment, and
learning by experience. The ﬁrst two deﬁning features of contractarian choice
(deliberate and unanimous choice) are then absent in Hume’s theory because he
rejects the idea that justice emerges from a contract, that is, from deliberate and
unanimous choice. However, Hume does think that justice is a mutually advan-
tageous institution (the third feature). In this respect, but only in this respect,
Hume’s theory may certainly be called contractarian. But perhaps we had better
avoid this usage, given its potentially misleading implications. Hume’s theory
is conventional in the sense he properly clariﬁed. This sense has only a partial
overlap with contractarianism.
It might be also misleading to regard Hume’s theory as a kind of indirect
utilitarianism. Indirect utilitarianism purports to offer us a public policy pro-
gram for redesigning our rules and conventions of justice to maximize social
welfare. Such approach is alien to Hume’s view. Hume thought that the rules
of justice carry the accumulated practical knowledge of our civilization. A sense
of practicality, rather than an idea of perfection or optimality, drives the evolu-
tion of justice. In fact, Hume alerts us against ideal rules of justice (e.g., per-
fect equality) that are impracticable and that would “reduce society to the most62 Horacio Spector
extreme indigence” (E, 28). Gradual and progressive evolution, judgment and
understanding, learning by experience, and the transformation of people’s cog-
nitive and motivational dispositions are the hallmarks of the Humean theory
of justice. These hallmarks stand in opposition to the assumptions of indirect
utilitarianism—static preferences, possibility of one-dimensional maximization
and institutional engineering.
Whereas indirect utilitarianism presents itself as a public blueprint for so-
cial reform, Hume offers his theory in order to explain a spontaneous process
of evolution to a cooperative and mutually advantageous society. Society is too
complex for proposing all-encompassing blueprints. Hume would have rejected
proposals that sought to maximize one single collective goal. History teaches us
that free human beings pursue various goals and that this constellation of vari-
ous goals is the true basis of civilization. On Hume’s view justice is an evolved
conventional system that allows human beings to carry on their lives in a pros-
perous and peaceful society. No more, no less.
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